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HUMANITY CONSTRAINS LOYALTY: 
FIDUCIARY DUTY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE 
CORPORATE DECISION MAKER 
Malcolm Rogge* 
ABSTRACT 
This article considers whether the values contained within the idea of 
human rights have normative priority over economic values as they 
are inscribed in shareholder-oriented interpretations of the duty of 
loyalty in corporate law. While stakeholder theorists have sought to 
expand the ambit of the fiduciary duty—arguing generally that 
corporate fiduciary law permits managers to take into account a 
broad range of stakeholder interests—this article shifts the frame of 
analysis: It proposes that the range of corporate fiduciary loyalty is 
constrained by human rights as normative values that are distinct 
from the strictly economic values that are given primacy in the 
shareholder-centered approach. This constraining effect occurs in 
decision-making and in appraisals of decisions taken quite apart 
from whatever fiduciary loyalty is thought to demand as a matter of 
positive law. In other words, human rights are “parents” of corporate 
law, rather than the converse. 
This article begins by considering a mixed question of law and 
ethics: Does a loyal corporate fiduciary have the freedom to make 
decisions concerning human rights for the specific regard of non-
shareholders, or must the loyal fiduciary treat human rights concerns 
in ways that are instrumental to enhancing stockholder interests? In 
shifting the focus away from what law places inside the “urn” of 
fiduciary duty (away from the debate over what categories of 
interests the fiduciary is given permission by law to consider), this 
question concerns itself with the “negative space” that shapes the 
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range of fiduciary duties from the outside. This novel approach 
reconfigures the contours of the shareholder-stakeholder debate by 
examining the constraints on the fiduciary duty concept within the 
larger normative ecosystem in which it resides. Recognizing these 
normative constraints, corporate law should expect only the 
“reflective loyalty” of flesh-and-blood decision makers. 
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INTRODUCTION:  
CONSTRAINING THE RANGE OF CORPORATE LOYALTY 
This article considers whether the values contained within the idea 
of human rights have normative priority over economic values as they 
are inscribed in shareholder-centered interpretations of corporate law’s 
duty of loyalty. It is about the interplay of the ideas, normative values, 
and laws that bring the corporate entity to life through the decisions 
taken by flesh-and-blood individuals. Focusing on the concept of 
fiduciary duty as one of the core components of globalized corporate 
law, this article proposes that the ethical values contained in human 
rights constrain the range of corporate fiduciary duties with respect to 
decisions made by the flesh-and-blood corporate directors and 
executives. 
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The first step of this inquiry is to pose a mixed question of law and 
ethics: Does a loyal corporate fiduciary have the freedom to make 
decisions concerning human rights for the specific regard of non-
shareholders, or must the loyal fiduciary treat human rights concerns in 
ways that are instrumental to enhancing stockholders’ interests 
(including stockholder wealth or welfare), or to advancing the 
corporation’s short-term or long-term economic interests? Putting the 
problem another way: If a corporate fiduciary pays regard to the human 
rights of “those who suffer”1 outside of the corporation for non-
instrumental reasons, does the decision maker push against (or 
perforate) the boundaries of mandatory corporate loyalty?2 This article 
considers the strength of prior ethical constraints on the range of 
corporate loyalty when the human rights of people who may be 
adversely affected by corporate activity are brought into the picture. 
While many stakeholder-oriented corporate law theorists have 
sought to expand the ambit of the corporate fiduciary duty—arguing 
generally that it already permits managers to take into account the 
interests of a broad range of stakeholders—this article suggests we shift 
the frame of analysis. Instead of debating over what concerns are 
thought to fit within the ambit of the corporate fiduciary duty, I propose 
that we turn our attention to the normative values that stand outside the 
“urn” of fiduciary duty and constrain its borders. I argue that the reach 
of corporate fiduciary loyalty is constrained by human rights as 
normative concerns that are qualitatively and foundationally distinct 
from the economic values that are given primacy in traditional 
shareholder-oriented interpretations of corporate law loyalty. My claim 
 
 1. Kaldor’s classic statement of the hypothetical compensation test requires that 
all those who suffer as a result of some economic policy or action be fully compensated 
for their loss while still allowing for a net gain for the rest of the community: 
There is no need for the economist to prove—as indeed he never could prove—
that as a result of the adoption of a certain measure nobody in the community is 
going to suffer. In order to establish his case, it is quite sufficient for him to show 
that even if all those who suffer as a result are fully compensated for their loss, the 
rest of the community will still be better off than before. 
Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons 
of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549, 550 (1939) (emphasis added). 
 2. Consider former Chief Justice Leo Strine’s statement that “the idea that 
directors can subordinate stockholder interests to other interests of the directors’ 
choosing is strained and at odds with the structure of our overall statute.” Leo E. Strine 
Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power 
and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 
50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 783 (2015) [hereinafter Dangers of Denial]. 
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is that the constraining effect of human rights as normative values 
occurs in decision-making and in appraisals of decisions taken, quite 
apart from whatever corporate law loyalty is thought to demand as a 
matter of positive law. Put simply, a business decision maker’s concerns 
about ethics and human rights constrain the ambit of corporate law 
duties, rather than the other way around. 
To illustrate my claim, I offer what I believe to be a helpful visual 
metaphor: Our task is to perceive what lies in the “negative space” that 
lies around and outside the positive statutory and doctrinal mandate of 
corporate fiduciary loyalty.3 The normative prior constraints of human 
rights, as grounded in the normative value of humanity, are relevant to 
decision makers not only for instrumental reasons that serve the 
corporate or shareholder interest, but as normative ends in themselves. 
Corporate law loyalty is just one normative constraint that shapes the 
contours of corporate decision-making among many others; in this 
sense, we ought not regard it to be an overarching apex duty. The 
corporate law duty of loyalty lies within a normative ecosystem and not 
above it. We should not regard corporate law as giving fiduciaries 
“permission” to consider the normative value of respecting human rights 
when making decisions. Rather, we should recognize that human rights 
constrain the reach and range of what corporate law fiduciary duties are 
able to require of decision makers in the first instance. Thus, human 
rights are “parents” of corporate fiduciary duty laws, rather than the 
other way around.4 
 
 3. See infra Figure 1. The negative space that lies around and outside the “urn” of 
corporate fiduciary duty. 
 4. Shifting the frame of analysis in this way aligns with Amartya Sen’s argument 
(drawing on the legal philosophy of H.L.A. Hart) that human rights are parents of law, 
rather than law’s offspring. In his Grotius lecture, Sen (referring to H.L.A. Hart) argues 
that human rights, as ethical principles, are parents of law and legislation rather than 
the other way around. See Amartya Sen, Human Rights and the Limits of Law, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2913, 2918 (2006). Similarly, I argue that human rights are parents of 
corporate law, rather than the other way around. Hart argues that: 
There is of course no simple identification to be made between moral and legal 
rights, but there is an intimate connection between the two, and this itself is one 
feature which distinguishes a moral right from other fundamental moral concepts. 
It is not merely that as a matter of fact men speak of their moral rights 
mainly when advocating their incorporation in a legal system, but that the concept 
of a right belongs to that branch of morality which is specifically concerned to 
determine when one person’s freedom may be limited by another’s and so to 
determine what actions may appropriately be made the subject of coercive 
legal rules. 














Figure 1. The negative space that lies around and outside the “urn” 
of corporate fiduciary duty. The statutory and doctrinal range of the 
fiduciary duty is defined by the image of the urn. This paper is 
concerned with the constraining force of plural values that lie around 
and outside the formal boundaries of the legal fiduciary duty. The 
positive law is shaped by the “negative” space that exists around it. 
Illustration: Malcolm Rogge. 
As shown in Figure 1, the range of corporate loyalty is defined not 
solely by positive law, nor is it circumscribed only by the caveats 
contained within the business judgment rule and common law corporate 
law doctrine. Instead, the power and reach of corporate loyalty is 
constrained by normative values that are inscribed in the idea of human 
rights as they are recognized globally in various instruments of 
 
H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 177 (1955). Sen 
argues that “the entirely legal routes to understanding human rights are not only 
misleading, they may also be foundationally mistaken.” Sen, supra, at 2914. 
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international law.5 This means that the center of the corporate decision 
maker’s value universe is not found in the dictates of positive corporate 
law loyalty, but in the flesh-and-blood decision maker’s reflective 
conscience as an ethical being whose worldview and lived experience 
are shaped by the idea of human rights, as they are broadly conceived in 
the world today. 
I. DEFINING LOYALTY 
A. LOYALTY AS THE “GRAVITATIONAL FORCE” OF CORPORATE LAW 
(BUT NOT THE ONLY FORCE THAT MATTERS) 
In his well-known treatise on corporate law, Robert C. Clark 
emphasizes the centrality of “loyalty” in shaping past and present 
corporate law: 
The overwhelming majority of particular rules, doctrines, and cases 
in corporate law are simply an explication of this duty [of loyalty] or 
of the procedural rules and institutional arrangements involved in 
implementing it. The history of corporate law is largely the history 
of the development of operational content for the duty of loyalty. 
Even many cases that appear to be about dull formalities or rules of 
the road in fact involve disputes arising out of alleged managerial 
disloyalty . . . . [T]his general fiduciary duty of loyalty is a residual 
concept that can include factual situations that no one has foreseen 
and categorized. The general duty [of loyalty] permits, and in fact 
has led to, a continuous evolution in corporate law.6 
It would not be an exaggeration to say that corporate law’s 
fiduciary loyalty mandate is tantamount to the “holy grail” of corporate 
law: Loyalty is an essential aspect of corporate law, though its precise 
meaning is never grasped completely. The core of loyalty is elusive by 
design. To employ another metaphor, corporate loyalty is no less than 
the gravitational force that holds corporate law, the corporate entity, and 
 
 5. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III), International Bill of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 
1948) (The International Bill of Human Rights is regarded to include the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its two 
Optional Protocols.). 
 6. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 34, 141 (1986) (emphasis omitted) 
[hereinafter CORPORATE LAW]. 
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the corporate system in place in the world. Without the ideas of 
fiduciary loyalty, duty, and trust, the corporate form would not be viable 
as a vehicle for investment, nor would the corporate system “hang 
together” in the world.7 And so, a theory about the place of human rights 
in business decision-making and in the world’s corporate system must 
contend with the omnipresence of fiduciary loyalty as a value, theme, 
and foundational concept in globalized corporate law. 
In the early days of the “holding corporation,” beginning in the 
State of New Jersey in the 1890s, related corporate entities were referred 
to as parent and daughter corporations.8 In today’s world of 
multinational enterprises, corporate groups (also known as “poly-
corporate” enterprises9) are joined together by equity relationships 
among parent and subsidiary corporations. Functionalist corporate law 
theorists regard limited liability as playing an “entity shielding” role in 
corporate law.10 
We ought to regard the duty of loyalty as playing an entity-
synthesizing function—in other words, corporate law’s loyalty mandate 
(among other ideational factors) makes the abstract, legally constituted 
corporate edifice hang together in the world.11 The duty of loyalty 
synthesizes the flesh-and-blood decision maker’s reflective conscience 
with the abstract corporate legal entity. With the globalization of the 
corporate system and its core ideational components, the entity-
synthesizing function of loyalty takes on global significance. Without 
loyal fiduciaries acting on behalf of each separate entity in the group, 
 
 7. On what makes things in the world “hang together,” see John G. Ruggie, What 
Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist 
Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. 855 (1998). 
 8. The equity relationships (wholly owned subsidiaries and affiliates) may also be 
accompanied by extensive contract relationships with other entities, such as joint 
venture agreements with other firms or governments. 
 9. The “poly-corporate” enterprise is comprised of several separately incorporated 
entities that are combined into a corporate group or holding company structure. For a 
discussion on the emergence of the modern poly-corporate enterprise, see JOSÉ 
ENGRÁCIA ANTUNES, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE GROUPS: AUTONOMY AND CONTROL IN 
PARENT-SUBSIDIARY RELATIONSHIPS IN US, GERMAN AND EU LAW: AN 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1994). 
 10. On the essential role of “entity shielding” and “asset partitioning” in corporate 
law, see Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of 
the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2006). 
 11. The entity-synthesizing function is a counterpart of the “entity shielding” 
function of limited liability and separate legal personality. Compare id., with Ruggie, 
supra note 7. 
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there would be no stable foundation for business corporations, 
multinational enterprises, or the corporate system as it exists in the 
world today. 
The fiduciary duty of loyalty is to the global firm what gravity is to 
the arch. The duty’s force holds each of the components in place, 
forming a resilient structure that may take many forms. We might call 
this resilient yet abstract structure the loyalty architecture of a business 











Figure 2. The force of loyalty as the gravity that holds the corporate 
edifice together. Each stone in the arch represents a legally separate 
company in a corporate group. The red arrows show how the 
directional force of loyalty (manifested in the actions and decisions 
made by flesh-and-blood fiduciaries) holds the legally constituted 
edifice together as a resilient structure. The keystone is the parent 
company—as an abstract entity, it does not exert force on its own, 
but is rather a placeholder. The active “force” that holds the edifice 
together is exerted through the loyal decision-making of flesh-and-
blood persons who have power over each separate corporate entity. 
As the diagram shows, it is the gravitational force that holds the 
separate components of the corporate group together, rather than any 
single abstract corporate entity on its own. Without the force of 
loyalty acting on corporate decision makers, the abstract corporate 
entities have no way of maintaining any coherent relation to one 
another in the world. Illustration: Karen A. Justl (for this paper). 
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As a universal value in the world’s corporate system, the force of 
loyalty acts upon all corporate entities like a gravitational force, pulling 
the various components of the enterprise together in the same way that 
gravity pulls separate stones together to form an arch. By holding 
managers and directors to basic standards of behavior through a flexible 
and “residual” fiduciary rule, the edifice of the corporate group takes 
shape and maintains its integrity and malleability over time.12 The 
demands of loyalty are defined by statutory and doctrinal expectations 
of appropriate conduct for flesh-and-blood decision makers, and yet, as I 
argue below, such demands are tempered and constrained by exogenous 
values that reside in the negative space around and outside of those very 
statutory and doctrinal constructs. As stated above, the duty of loyalty 
should not be regarded as an overarching apex duty, rather, it exists 
within an ecosystem of other norms and values that interact. In today’s 
global ecosystem of ideas, norms, values, and laws, human rights are 
parents of business law rather than business law’s offspring. 
While many values and ideational factors are needed for the 
corporation to “hang together” in the world, the corporate duty of 
loyalty is regarded as playing a very specific role in this regard: the duty 
of loyalty is imposed on the corporation’s flesh-and-blood decision 
makers to put a “brake” on managerial self-dealing that would 
undermine the shareholders’ interests.13 The principal-agent theory of 
the corporation goes a step further: by this view, the shareholders are 
 
 12. Allen et al. speak of the fiduciary duty as embodying the “duty of obedience to 
the documents creating the relationship . . . the duty to obey the principal’s commands.” 
WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES 
AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 26 (4th ed. 2012) (emphasis 
omitted). But, Clark states in his corporate law casebook that “the relationship between 
shareholders and directors is not well described as being between principals and 
agents.” CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6, at 22. 
 13. For example: 
[M]anagement has a great deal of power, which it can use both for good—to 
increase firm value—and for bad—to line its own pockets. Without any 
requirement to act on behalf of shareholders, there would be little to stop 
management from overpaying itself, hiring friends and relatives as consultants, 
and buying inputs from other firms in which it has an ownership interest at inflated 
prices. Moreover, it is hard to write a contract that specifically rules out all the 
possible bad actions that management might undertake. Making management a 
fiduciary of shareholders puts a brake on these activities, in general terms, by 
exposing a manager who acts openly to enrich himself at the expense of 
shareholders to a law suit. 
Oliver Hart, An Economist’s View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 299, 303 
(1993) 
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regarded as superior “principals,” while the day-to-day decision makers 
who are appointed to manage the corporation are regarded as their 
subordinate “agents.”14 The hierarchical dimension of the corporate 
structure is manifested by the inferior agent’s “duty to obey the 
principal’s commands.”15 It is thought that strict discipline of 
subordinate agents is required to fulfill the legal entity’s economic 
function as a reliable and maximal vehicle for investment by the 
superior principals.16 Dereliction of duty, abuse of power, or self-dealing 
by the directors and officers in any of the legally separate components 
will weaken the superior-inferior/principal-agent structure as a whole, 
and if left unchecked, such transgressions will destroy or corrupt the 
corporate enterprise beyond recognition. 
In a world of multinational enterprises, transnational loyalty 
architectures hold together the poly-corporate groups that span 
continents today. With loyal fiduciaries acting at the helm of each 
legally separate entity in the group, the multinational enterprise holds its 
form against innumerable pressures that would otherwise bring it down. 
A theory of human rights and business must contend directly with the 
normative force of corporate law loyalty within the globalized corporate 
system. The maxim humanity constrains loyalty takes us one step closer 
towards the goal of articulating a theory of human rights and business. 
B. DISTINGUISHING LOYALTY IN CORPORATE LAW FROM ALLEGIANCE IN 
CORPORATE CULTURE 
For clarity’s sake, it is crucial to distinguish between corporate 
law’s loyalty mandate and the broader and looser cultural expectation of 
 
 14. In his critique of the principal-agent theory of the corporation, in his section 
titled, “Managers Are Not Agents of Stockholders,” Clark explains that “[t]hough 
lawyers use the concept of agency in a variety of senses, the core legal concept implies 
a relationship in which the principal retains the power to control and direct the activities 
of the agent.” See Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in 
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 56 (John W. Pratt & 
Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985) [hereinafter Agency Costs]. 
 15. See ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 12, at 26. 
 16. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of 
Stakeholder Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3547409. 
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allegiance within a business.17 It is also important to understand how 
loyalty and allegiance interact. At the same time, it is essential to 
recognize that a corporation’s employees (as subordinates) are expected 
to respect and comply with the directions given by their superiors, 
including those policies set by the highest decision-making authorities 
of the corporation. While the duty of loyalty has a distinctly legal flavor, 
the sense of allegiance that company directors and employees feel 
towards the company has a distinctly cultural and psychological 
dimension. In most companies, a blanket cultural value of allegiance to 
the firm is instilled across the enterprise. Every person who works for a 
firm is expected to identify with that firm to some degree, whether a 
low-level employee or division boss. The firm is a team; the managers 
and employees of the firm play on the same team. Everyone on the team 
is expected to pool their efforts to advance the firm’s objectives. The 
broad expectation of allegiance to the corporate team is entirely distinct 
from the demand of corporate loyalty, and yet, the cultural allegiance of 
all members of the team is no less critical for realizing the firm’s goals. 
Indeed, “[w]ithout a powerful corporate culture, a company cannot fuse 
high performance with high integrity at all levels in all locations—from 
the gritty shop floor in Western China to the sleek headquarters tower in 
New York.”18 
Within the firm, a corporate culture of allegiance is promoted and 
mandated for employees through the internally-oriented logic of 
employment law. Whereas corporate law’s loyalty mandate for 
managers crystalizes in the fiduciary duty concept, in employment law, 
the allegiance of servant to master is based on expectations of 
subservience and obedience. An employee’s allegiance to the firm arises 
out of a duty to obey superiors; hence, an employee who does not 
demonstrate sufficient allegiance to the firm is regarded as 
insubordinate. The value of allegiance is critical for the operational 
success of a firm insofar as the diligent efforts of the firm’s employees 
are required to meet the firm’s objectives. At the same time, the value of 
 
 17. Ben Heineman, the former General Counsel of General Electric, defines 
corporate culture as “the shared principles (the values, the policies, and the attitudes) 
and the shared practices (the norms, systems, and processes) that influence how people 
feel, think, and behave, from the top of the corporation to the bottom, all across the 
globe.” BEN W. HEINEMAN, THE INSIDE COUNSEL REVOLUTION: RESOLVING THE 
PARTNER-GUARDIAN TENSION 92 (2016). 
 18. Id. at 91. 
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fiduciary loyalty is critical for the structural and organizational 
coherence of any corporate entity and corporate group. 
The value of fiduciary loyalty plays a distinct role in the ontology 
of the corporate entity or corporate group. Contrary to what the 
principal-agent theory of corporate governance seems to imply, the 
demand of loyalty is not properly analogous to the master-servant 
dichotomy that lies at the foundation of employment law. Moreover, as 
Clark has argued, the relationship of a corporate fiduciary to the 
corporation is not properly characterized solely in terms of a contractual 
relationship, as the “nexus of contracts” theory of corporate governance 
holds.19 In direct opposition to the nexus of contracts theory of the firm, 
Clark argues that “[m]ost of the particular rules that make up the legal 
relationships among corporate officers, directors, and stockholders—that 
is, the relationships that constitute corporate law and give operational 
meaning to the legal concept of the corporation—are not the product of 
actual contracts made by the persons subject to them.”20 As Clark 
argues, the authority of the corporate director is derived from the 
corporate law statute rather than by any term that is stipulated in an 
“actual contract”—she is elected by the shareholders and is given 
authority to manage the business by statute.21 By this understanding, the 
manager is an elected “director” or appointed “officer” of the 
corporation, and is not a subordinate employee, nor de-facto agent of the 
shareholders.22 The corporate director’s authority to make decisions on 
behalf of the corporation does not rest in the director’s contractual 
relationship to the legal entity. The loyalty mandate of corporate law is 
distinct from the obedience mandate that subordinate employees owe to 
their superiors. It is critical to understand this distinction when 
considering the relationship of corporate decision makers to the 
 
 19. See Agency Costs, supra note 14, at 60. In his critique of Jensen and 
Meckling’s influential theory of the private corporation, Clark asks: “[I]s it realistic or 
useful to view the modern public corporation as consisting only, or even principally, of 
a set of contracts? I think not. [Jensen and Meckling’s] extreme contractualist viewpoint 
is almost perverse. It is likely to blind us to most of the features of the modern public 
corporation that are distinctive, puzzling, and worth exploring.” Id. See generally 
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 20. See id. In making his argument, Clark quotes extensively from Jensen & 
Meckling. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 19, at 311. 
 21. See Agency Costs, supra note 14, at 56–57, 60. 
 22. See id. at 56. 
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corporation and its shareholders, and it is critical for understanding the 
range and limits of corporate law’s fiduciary mandate, as we shall see 
below. 
As argued above, the character of fiduciary loyalty to the 
corporation is qualitatively, ontologically, and legally distinct from the 
loyalty that is expected of servant to master and of “agent” to 
“principal.” With this distinction in mind, we can better articulate how 
human rights and the value of humanity as normative ends in themselves 
lie in the negative space that exists around and outside the positive range 
of corporate law’s fiduciary mandate. 
As normative values, human rights have a constraining influence 
and effect on the range of fiduciary loyalty that is expected of, and may 
be demanded of, corporate decision makers. By this exogenous 
constraining effect, corporate decision-making is influenced and 
circumscribed by the value of human rights and humanity independent 
of the results of quantitative economic cost-benefit analysis with regard 
to business risk and return on investment. This is not to say that 
concerns about business risk and return on investment are irrelevant 
when it comes to matters of human rights. Rather, the point is that the 
values of human rights are not subordinate to the value of corporate 
loyalty. Human rights as normative values do not have subordinate 
normative status compared to corporate loyalty as a duty, or as a value, 
that a corporate fiduciary is expected to honor. In other words, the 
corporate loyalty mandate is by no means the apex duty that stands in 
priority to all other normative values that a corporate decision maker 
must contend with in day-to-day and long-run decision-making. 
To recapitulate: The firm’s culture of allegiance is amorphous and 
all-encompassing. In contrast, a director’s legal duty of loyalty is more 
precisely defined, yet still sometimes fuzzy. Corporate directors are 
expected to follow the particular fiduciary mandates of the jurisdiction 
in which the corporation is domiciled, and so, the details of their legal 
duties may vary depending on what geographical division their company 
is based in and what law applies.23 That being said, it is also quite 
 
 23. See DETLEV F. VAGTS, WILLIAM S. DODGE, HAROLD HONGJU KOH & HANNAH 
L. BUXBAUM, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 161–62 (5th ed. 2014). The 
malleable fiduciary duty concept exhibits some plasticity across legal systems—its 
contours vary from place to place. Legal scholars Lucian Bebchuk and Mark Roe note 
that while “general principles of corporate law may often be the same across countries,” 
such as the fiduciary principle, the principles may be implemented in different or even 
radically different ways. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path 
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evident that the global parent company may establish firm-wide policies 
to which the directors and managers of all subsidiary entities in the 
group owe their allegiance.24 For instance, the parent company board 
might seek to embed a global policy to respect human rights across the 
firm. 
Closely related to its policy-setting role, the parent company also 
strives to set the overall culture of the organization—directors and 
managers throughout the group are expected to conform to the norms 
and values that percolate from the top.25 The parent company has many 
tools at its disposal to inculcate such allegiance among the enterprise’s 
personnel, including incentives, stipulated obligations in contracts, and 
global training programs.26 Putting all of this together, it becomes clear 
that managerial decision-making at all levels within the corporate group 
structure is shaped by an amalgam of intra-firm norms and values 
(blanket allegiance, policies, business culture), legal obligations 
(fiduciary duties, contractual commitments), as well as industry 
standards, voluntary codes, and expressions of “soft law.”27 The 
corporate fiduciary mandate exists within this amalgam of norms. 
 
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 154–55 
(1999). 
 24. Heineman writes: 
The expression of . . . fundamental corporate principles or aspirations will take 
many written forms in all the basic documents of the corporation from the short to 
the long, from the summary to the detailed: for example, a code of conduct; a 
guide to the spirit and letter of core company policies; detailed guidelines for each 
policy area (e.g., antitrust, labor, and employment); the Annual Report; the Proxy 
Statement; a Citizenship Report; governance guidelines; and organic, accessible 
education and training materials . . . . No task of the General Counsel is more 
important than working with the CEO and other senior leaders on the forceful, 
continuous delivery of these core aspirations. 
HEINEMAN, supra note 17, at 92–93. 
 25. On risk management, fiduciary duties, and the “tone at the top,” see Martin 
Lipton, Risk Management and the Board of Directors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (July 28, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/
07/28/risk-management-and-the-board-of-directors-3/ [https://perma.cc/ZA4M-SHV8]. 
 26. See HEINEMAN, supra note 17, at 91–128 (“The Cultural Imperative”). Vagts et 
al. note that “[t]he efficiency of the overarching corporate structure may be reinforced 
by means such as a training program, conveying to executives from different societies a 
sense of the X Company ‘way of doing things.’ Incentive programs will reinforce the 
tendency to pursue the general goals which central headquarters sets.” VAGTS ET. AL, 
supra note 23, at 186. 
 27. Writing in 1997, Peter Muchlinski proposed, “it is arguable that a ‘proto-law’ is 
emerging where the [multinational enterprise] establishes firm-wide internal codes of 
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The range of the fiduciary mandate, I argue, is constrained and 
circumscribed by values that reside within the negative space that lies 
around and outside of the borders of positive law. We shall now 
consider how this complex assemblage of norms, values, rules, and laws 
(in positive and negative space) shape managerial decision-making at 
various levels of the firm on matters that relate to human rights. 
II. HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMANITARIAN MOTIVES, AND CORPORATE LAW 
DUTIES 
What, if anything, does the law require of business decision makers 
who face a quandary over respecting human rights and advancing the 
economic interests of the corporation and its shareholders? For over a 
century, Anglo-American legislators, jurists, scholars, and practitioners 
have disagreed about how to referee the colliding internal and external 
demands on corporate managers. At the very least, jurists mostly seem 
to agree that a for-profit corporation is not a community service 
organization, nor a philanthropic cause. Nonetheless, there remains a 
strong sense that a business corporation has a social role to play, and 
that corporations have responsibilities to the broader community as well 
as to shareholders. Indeed, the United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, adopted by the UN Human Rights Council 
in 2011, asserts that corporations have a responsibility to respect human 
rights.28 A brief review of leading cases in the United States reveals just 
 
practice to be followed by managers and employees.” PETER MUCHLINSKI, GLOBAL 
LAW WITHOUT A STATE 83 (Gunther Teubner ed. 1997). He notes that “industry-wide 
codes of practice can act as a benchmark for assessing the reasonableness or otherwise 
of individual corporate behaviour,” and suggests that in the future, courts will consider 
these codes as benchmarks in assessing the requirements of the duty of care (in tort). Id. 
at 84. By this feedback loop, “such applications of voluntary industry codes go beyond 
internal self-regulation and contribute to the content of ‘official’ law. At this point the 
voluntary code becomes a method of affecting the external environment.” Id. 
 28. See John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General), Rep. on the 
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises: Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, 13, U.N. Doc 
A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (explaining that the corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights is “a global standard of expected conduct for all businesses”). For a recent 
survey of the global uptake of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights and 
corporate “human rights due diligence” in domestic legislation and soft law 
mechanisms around the world, see John G. Ruggie et al., Making ‘Stakeholder 
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how unsettled the question of a corporation’s social role and community 
responsibility remains. Even today, after a century of debate, jurists and 
scholars continue to clash on the subject. 
The somewhat crude, but intuitive, distinction between for-profit 
corporations and philanthropic not-for-profit causes was at the center of 
the seminal and much disputed case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., heard 
by the court over a century ago.29 In that case, the Michigan Supreme 
Court found that automaker Henry Ford wrongly subordinated the 
interests of shareholders for the benefit of other stakeholders, including 
his employees.30 The minority shareholder plaintiffs, the Dodge brothers 
(who also happened to be in the auto manufacturing business) alleged 
that Mr. Ford chose to substantially lower the sale price of the Ford 
Motor Company’s automobiles rather than pay a dividend to the 
stockholders.31 The alleged redirection of profits occurred during a 
period of remarkable growth of the Ford company.32 The company was 
doing extremely well.33 Demand for Ford automobiles was high, and the 
public was benefitting directly from Ford’s decision to lower the cost of 
a new car.34 The Dodge brothers felt that they had been treated unfairly 
and had been wrongly deprived of corporate benefits that ought to have 
accrued to them as shareholders.35 While the lower cost to the consumer 
was certainly a social benefit for non-shareholders, the brothers argued 
that such benefit came at a direct cost to Ford shareholders.36 The effect 
of Ford’s decision was to trade off shareholder gain for non-shareholder 
gain, and this, they argued, was improper.37 They alleged that Ford 
intended “to continue the corporation henceforth as a semi-
eleemosynary (i.e. semi-charitable) institution and not as a business 
institution.”38 To support their assertion, the brothers pointed to a public 
statement made by Ford, where he said, “[m]y ambition . . . is to employ 
 
Capitalism’ Work: Contributions from Business & Human Rights 5–27 (Harv. Kennedy 
Sch. Fac. Rsch., Working Paper No. 20-034, 2020). 
 29. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 30. See id. at 684. 
 31. See id. at 682–83. 
 32. See id. at 683. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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still more men; to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the 
greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their 
homes.”39 By these words, the Dodge brothers alleged that Mr. Ford had 
publicly disclosed that he intended to run the business primarily for 
philanthropic ends rather than to make a profit for its shareholders.40 Mr. 
Ford, in effect, was running a for-profit corporation as if it were a not-
for-profit organization. This move, they argued was ultra vires his role 
as a corporate fiduciary in a for-profit business enterprise.41 
For his part, Ford argued that humanitarian motives were permitted 
in business decision-making, insisting that “[a]lthough a manufacturing 
corporation cannot engage in humanitarian works as its principal 
business, the fact that it is organized for profit does not prevent the 
existence of implied powers to carry on with humanitarian motives [and] 
such charitable works as are incidental to the main business of the 
corporation.”42 The court was not impressed by this argument, 
concluding that Mr. Ford’s motives and actions were tantamount to 
undermining the “for-profit” status of Ford Motor Co.43 The court’s 
remarkable statement on the primary purpose of a business corporation 
warrants full reproduction here: 
The difference between an incidental humanitarian expenditure of 
corporate funds for the benefit of the employés [sic], like the 
building of a hospital for their use and the employment of agencies 
for the betterment of their condition, and a general purpose and plan 
to benefit mankind at the expense of others, is obvious. There should 
be no confusion (of which there is evidence) of the duties which Mr. 
Ford conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the general 
public and the duties which in law he and his codirectors owe to 
protesting, minority stockholders. A business corporation is 
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. 
The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The 
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to 
attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to 
the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among 
stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes. 
. . . . 
 
 39. Id. at 671. 
 40. See id. at 672. 
 41. See id. at 681, 683–64. 
 42. Id. at 684. 
 43. Id. 
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[I]t is not within the lawful powers of a board of directors to shape 
and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental 
benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting 
others, and no one will contend that, if the avowed purpose of the 
defendant directors was to sacrifice the interests of shareholders, it 
would not be the duty of the courts to interfere.44 
While the court stated that devoting profits to purposes other than 
enriching the shareholders was beyond the lawful power of 
management, its language left much room for interpretation, especially 
regarding the quantum of “incidental benefit” that might lawfully accrue 
to non-shareholders.45 In the result, the court determined that Mr. Ford 
acted outside his lawful powers as a board member and upheld the lower 
court’s decree that Ford Motor Co. must pay a dividend to the 
stockholders.46 By this decision, certain humanitarian motives of 
company directors to benefit the wider community were subordinated by 
law to the for-profit purpose of the business corporation.47 
The obvious question which arises today is whether a corporate 
decision maker who gives priority to concerns about the human rights of 
non-shareholders undermines the for-profit purpose of the business 
organization. As in Dodge, the question might be answered by 
examining whether the corporate decision maker’s humanitarian 
motives were “incidental” to increasing stockholder wealth, or whether 
they were part of a “general purpose and plan to benefit mankind at the 
expense of [the shareholders].”48 By this reasoning, if the corporate 
decision maker considers the human rights of non-shareholders in a way 
that is instrumental for short-term or long-term stockholder gain, then no 
issue arises. 
If, on the other hand, the corporate decision maker sacrifices 
shareholder gain to protect the human rights of non-shareholders, 
without regard to shareholder interests, then by this reasoning, the 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 684 (describing such a use of profits as “sacrific[ing] the interests of 
shareholders”). 
 46. Id. at 685. 
 47. Though much debated, it has been suggested that Mr. Ford expounded on the 
social purpose of his pricing policy as a ruse, his true motive being to harm certain 
minority shareholders who also happened to be his main industry competitors—the 
Dodge Brothers. See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 
277, 315–20 (1998). 
 48. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. 
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decision maker undermines the for-profit purpose of the corporation. As 
the court stated, “[a] business corporation is organized and carried on 
primarily for the profit of the stockholders” and “[t]he discretion of 
directors . . . does not extend . . . to the reduction of profits . . . in order 
to devote them to other purposes.”49 In other words, a corporate director 
may expend corporate funds for the “incidental” benefit of non-
shareholders, but may not expend corporate funds for the “general 
purpose” of benefitting non-shareholders. 
There are, however, important ways in which the distinction 
between “incidental” and “general purpose” social benefit in Dodge 
does not translate well regarding concerns over human rights. There is 
no sense in which the violation or protection of a human right should be 
regarded as a merely “incidental” matter from any perspective: Respect 
for human rights is not a matter of philanthropy. The court’s reasoning 
reflects an instrumentalist approach—the limits of this approach when 
dealing with human rights issues will be addressed in the following 
section. 
The circumstances of Dodge were distinct from situations that fall 
within the ambit of “business and human rights,” in which people with 
no connection to the corporation may face grave threats to their personal 
security, fundamental freedoms, or way of life because of some action 
taken by the company or linked to the company. And so, we must go 
further in our inquiry about if and when humanitarian motives and 
priority concern for the human rights of non-shareholders might 
constrain the range of corporate loyalty. 
A. THE “PRIMACY” GIVEN TO SHAREHOLDERS IS CONSTRAINED BY AN 
ECOSYSTEM OF NORMS AND VALUES 
Facially, the words of the Michigan Supreme Court in 1919 appear 
to be unambiguous: “[a] business corporation is organized and carried 
on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”50 And yet, much debate 
has ensued over the last century about whether or not these words 
inscribe the principle of shareholder primacy into corporate law. This 
debate remains unresolved and passionately argued even today.51 In 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See generally Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 16; Malcolm Rogge, Bringing 
Corporate Governance Down-to-Earth: From Culmination Outcomes to 
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2008, Lynn Stout contended that without Dodge, the positive law 
supporting shareholder primacy was very thin.52 Some scholars have 
argued that the century-old Dodge decision has been misread—that it is 
not properly regarded as a case about the limits of social responsibility 
of business.53 They argue that the case is really about minority 
shareholder oppression, the abuse of director power, and unfair 
treatment.54 For instance, D. Gordon Smith emphasizes that the case 
involved a closely held corporation, and argues that its application to the 
modern, diffusely owned, publicly traded company is very limited.55 
Similarly, Einer Elhauge argues that “the case really involved a conflict 
of interest raising duty-of-loyalty concerns,” such that its relevance to 
the question of corporate social responsibility is questionable.56 Today, 
the case of eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark (the “Craigslist 
case”) is regarded by many as a reaffirmation of the essential distinction 
between a for-profit and not-for-profit organization.57 The rapidly 
growing popularity of ESG (environmental, social, and governance) 
factor investing over the last decade has reignited the debate over 
 
Comprehensive Outcomes in Shareholder and Stakeholder Capitalism, 35 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming Feb. 2021). 
 52. Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. 
REV. 163, 165 (2008). 
 53. See D. Gordon Smith, eBay v. Newmark: A Modern Version of Dodge v. Ford 
Motor Company, THE CONGLOMERATE (Sept. 9, 2010), [hereinafter A Modern Version 
of Dodge v. Ford], https://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/09/ebay-v-newmark-a-
modern-version-of-dodge-v-ford-motor-company.html [https://perma.cc/M5GB-6PVL]. 
But cf. Stephen Bainbridge, Is Dodge v. Ford Motor Company a Close 




 54. See A Modern Version of Dodge v. Ford, supra note 53. 
 55. See id. Bucking the trend in 1997, Smith argued that “the shareholder primacy 
norm is nearly irrelevant to the ordinary business decisions of modern corporations.” D. 
Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 279 (1998). 
 56. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 733, 772–73 (2005). According to this argument, Mr. Ford’s true motivation 
was to induce the stock price to drop so that he could buy back the Dodge Brothers’ 
share of Ford stock. See id. 
 57. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). In the Craigslist case, the Court of Chancery of 
Delaware opined that “[t]he corporate form . . . is not an appropriate vehicle for purely 
philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other stockholders interested in realizing 
a return on their investment.” Id. at 34. 
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whether corporate fiduciaries have a duty to maximize profit (and 
thereby maximize shareholder value).58 
In a now classic paper in corporate law theory, Henry Hansmann 
and Reinier Kraakman argued in 2000 that corporate law around the 
world was “converging” on the State of Delaware’s shareholder primacy 
model.59 They concluded that “[t]he shareholder-oriented model has 
emerged as the normative consensus not just because of the failure of 
the alternatives, but because important economic forces have made the 
virtues of that model increasingly salient.”60 The validity of their 
“convergence” claim was contested from the outset and continues to be 
debated today.61 Without a doubt, seminal cases from the United States, 
in particular from the Delaware Court of Chancery, have had 
tremendous influence on lawyers, business managers, and legislators in 
jurisdictions worldwide. It bears noting that the majority of the world’s 
largest and most successful companies are incorporated in Delaware.62 
 
 58. See generally Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 16; Rogge, supra note 51. 
 59. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001). Recent reforms of Finnish corporate law, it is 
argued, support Hansmann and Kraakman’s “convergence” theory. See Ville Pönkä, 
The Convergence of Law: The Finnish Limited Liability Companies Act as an Example 
of the So-Called “Americanization” of European Company Law, 14 EUR. CO. L. 22, 22 
(2017). 
 60. Hansmann, supra note 59, at 449. 
 61. For instance, in his chronicle of the “industrialization of English law,” 
Professor Ron Harris also observes a style of “convergence” in the corporate form; 
however, he rejects the view that there has been a monocausal trend towards efficiency 
in the historical development of the corporation. See RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING 
ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, 1720-1844, at 15 
(2000). Harris shows how contingent political interests and public debates played an 
important role in how corporate law was taking shape during the 18th and 19th 
centuries. See id. Professors Roe and Bebchuk also evince skepticism, arguing that the 
“convergence of corporate structures” is not inevitable given vast differences in 
“opinions, culture, ideology, and political orientation” in different jurisdictions. See 
Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 23, at 132. Such factors, they argue, “impede” 
convergence. Id. 
 62. During the period from 1930 to 2010, more than half of all U.S. corporations 
(new and existing) were domiciled in Delaware; by 2010, approximately 70% of newly 
incorporated U.S. public companies were incorporated under Delaware law. See Sarath 
Sanga, Network Effects in Corporate Governance, 63 J.L. & ECON. 1, 17–18, 21, 48 
(2020). In 2015, 66% of the world’s Fortune 500 firms were Delaware corporations and 
86% of all IPOs involved a Delaware corporation. See J.J. Harwayne Leitner & Leanne 
C. McGrory, The “Delaware Advantage” Applies to Nonprofits, Too, BUS. L. TODAY 
(Nov. 20, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/
2016/11/01_leitner/ [https://perma.cc/FG64-MCRN]. 
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Chief Justice Leo Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court (as he then 
was) believes that the ongoing rift over shareholder primacy lies in 
confusion between what the law is and what it should be—between lex 
lata and lex ferenda.63 He argues that, like it or not, the overall power 
and accountability structure of Delaware corporate law is consistent 
only with a view that the primary purpose of a business corporation is to 
make money for shareholders.64 Strine’s own restatement of the law is 
that “within the limits of their discretion, directors must make 
stockholder welfare their sole end, and that other interests may be taken 
into consideration only as a means of promoting stockholder welfare.”65 
Moreover, he argues that the Delaware Supreme Court has “highlighted 
the instrumental nature of other constituencies and interests. Non-
stockholder constituencies and interests can be considered, but only 
instrumentally.”66 This approach, Strine argues, bespeaks the intent of 
the “power and accountability structure” that is built into the Delaware 
corporate law statute.67 In A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 
 
 63. See Leo E. Strine, The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law 
of Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499, 500 (2002). 
 64. See Dangers of Denial, supra note 2, at 766. Strine refers specifically to 
Delaware corporate law, though the corporate law of other jurisdictions shares many of 
the same features. Id. He writes: “advocates for corporate social responsibility pretend 
that directors do not have to make stockholder welfare the sole end of corporate 
governance, within the limits of their legal discretion . . . .” Id. at 763. He argues that 
the overall power and accountability structure of Delaware corporate law “focuses 
corporate managers on stockholder welfare by allocating power only to a single 
constituency, the stockholders.” Id. at 766. 
 65. Id. at 768 (emphasis added). This approach appears to align adroitly with the 
instrumental approach advocated by Michael Jensen, who, in rejecting stakeholder 
theory, argues that “[v]alue maximization (or value seeking) provides the following 
answer to the tradeoff question: Spend an additional dollar on any constituency 
provided the long-term value added to the firm from such expenditure is a dollar or 
more.” Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate 
Objective Function, 22 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 32, 36 (2010). 
 66. Dangers of Denial, supra note 2, at 771 (emphasis added). 
 67. See id. at 780–81. It should be noted that while Strine describes what he 
understands to be the apparent demands of positive law, he is not arguing about what 
the law ought to be. His view is that a revival of externality regulation is needed to 
address concerns about the adverse impacts of corporations in society. He is also on 
record stating, “no one occupying a position of trust and authority over an organization 
that affects the many may escape the responsibility to apply one’s conscience—one’s 
sense of right and wrong—when deciding how to manage the organization.” Leo E. 
Strine, Jr., Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose II: An Encouragement for Future 
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Robert Rhee echoes Strine’s argument while adducing empirical 
evidence that U.S. courts are increasingly expressive about the 
shareholder value maximization imperative.68 Rhee’s conclusion is 
unequivocal: “shareholder primacy is judge-made law.”69 Generalizing 
to the United States as a whole, he argues that “[s]hareholder primacy 
does not exist as a single locus rule-sanction in the form of an 
enforceable fiduciary duty, but instead weaves through a series of rules 
of corporate law and the architecture of the corporate and market 
systems.”70 And yet, Allen, Kraakman, and Subramanian understand 
shareholder priority as a value, not as law per se: “shareholder priority 
more closely resembles a deep but implicit value in American corporate 
law than a legal rule in any normal sense.”71 
And so, the debate over shareholder primacy and the core purpose 
of the corporation in law and in culture continues among the most 
eminent jurists, scholars, and commentators.72 As this debate remains 
 
Consideration from Professors Johnson and Millon, 74. WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1165, 
1166 (2017). 
 68. See Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, HARV. L. SCH. F. 
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Shareholder Primacy] (emphasis 
added), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/04/11/a-legal-theory-of-shareholder-
primacy/ [https://perma.cc/GH7H-A2MD]. 
 69. Id.; see also Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 
MINN. L. REV. 1951, 2016–17 (2018). 
 70. Rhee, supra note 69, at 1967. 
 71. See ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 12, at 271. 
 72. See, e.g., Stefan J. Padfield, Corporate Governance and the Omnipresent 
Specter of Political Bias: The Duty to Calculate ROI, MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 5) (“[N]ot only is shareholder wealth maximization the optimal goal of 
corporate governance, but it is fairly characterized as the current rule of corporate 
governance in many relevant jurisdictions including, importantly, Delaware.”); Doug 
Sundheim, CEOs Have a Responsibility to Help Lead Society, FORBES (Aug. 4, 2020, 
1:48 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougsundheim/2020/08/04/ceos-have-a-respon
sibility-to-help-lead-society/#349e375170d5 [https://perma.cc/7K4L-X8LR] (rejecting 
Harvard economist Greg Mankiw’s reiteration of shareholder value maximization as the 
sole goal for managers, and arguing that “[g]ood CEOs are always weighing social 
costs that don’t immediately show up on the bottom line” and boards should look for 
“CEOs who can balance the demands of multiple stakeholders.”); N. Gregory Mankiw, 
CEOs Are Qualified to Make Profits, Not Lead Society, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/24/business/ceos-profits-shareholders.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZB7E-QRTL]; Martin Lipton, It’s Time to Adopt the New Paradigm, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 11, 2019), https://corpgov.
law.harvard.edu/2019/02/11/its-time-to-adopt-the-new-paradigm 
[https://perma.cc/QJP8-5KRA]; see also Martin Lipton, The New Paradigm: A 
Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations 
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unsettled, the question remains of whether shareholder primacy 
constrains a director’s latitude for addressing human rights concerns, or 
whether the normative value of human rights constrains the power of 
shareholder primacy and the range of corporate law’s fiduciary mandate. 
As the title of this article suggests, the range of corporate law loyalty is 
constrained by the value of humanity and the idea of human rights, not 
the other way around. 
Almost a century after Dodge was decided by the Michigan 
Supreme Court, the Delaware Court of Chancery revisited the thorny 
question of corporate purpose in the Craigslist case.73 Craig Newmark 
and James Buckmaster, the founders of Craigslist, thought of their 
online platform of classified advertisements as a community service. 
Even so, they formed a for-profit corporation and sold a minority 
interest for a very tidy sum to eBay Domestic Holdings.74 When eBay 
sought to monetize the Craigslist service, the controlling Newmark and 
Buckmaster implemented a defensive stockholder rights plan to stop 
them.75 As a minority stakeholder, eBay sued Newmark and 
Buckmaster, the controlling directors, for breach of fiduciary duty, and 
petitioned the court to halt the defensive maneuvers.76 
The Delaware Court of Chancery struck out the stockholder rights 
plan on the grounds that it violated the controlling directors’ fiduciary 
duties to minority shareholder eBay.77 In his decision, Chancellor 
Chandler reaffirmed the centrality of profit making in an organization 
that is incorporated as a “for-profit” business: 
Jim and Craig did prove that they personally believe craigslist should 
not be about the business of stockholder wealth maximization, now 
or in the future. As an abstract matter, there is nothing inappropriate 
about an organization seeking to aid local, national, and global 
communities by providing a website for online classifieds that is 
largely devoid of monetized elements. Indeed, I personally 
appreciate and admire Jim’s and Craig’s desire to be of service to 
 
and Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth, INT’L BUS. 
COUNCIL OF THE WORLD ECON. F. (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/
wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.25960.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/9P4T-J6J3] [hereinafter 
The New Paradigm Roadmap]. 
 73. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 74. See id. at 8, 11–12. 
 75. See id. at 14–15, 22. 
 76. See id. at 25. 
 77. See id. at 34–35. 
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communities. The corporate form in which craigslist operates, 
however, is not an appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends, 
at least not when there are other stockholders interested in realizing a 
return on their investment. Jim and Craig opted to form craigslist, 
Inc. as a for-profit Delaware corporation and voluntarily accepted 
millions of dollars from eBay as part of a transaction whereby eBay 
became a stockholder. Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, 
the craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and 
standards that accompany that form. Those standards include acting 
to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its 
stockholders. The “Inc.” after the company name has to mean at 
least that.78 
Echoing the words from Dodge almost one hundred years later, 
Chancellor Chandler held that in a for-profit corporation, the standard to 
follow is “to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its 
stockholders,” and that the corporation “is not an appropriate vehicle for 
purely philanthropic ends.”79 In this context, corporate concern for the 
interests of non-shareholders is within bounds if it is required by law, or 
if it serves to promote the value of the corporation for the stockholders. 
By this reading, we might fairly characterize Delaware corporate law as 
mandating an instrumentalist approach to philanthropy and corporate 
social responsibility (“CSR”).80 We shall now consider whether the 
instrumentalist imperative that is apparently inscribed in Anglo-
America’s most important corporate law makes it more difficult for 
corporate decision makers to give priority to respect for human rights, 
and we will consider how the maxim humanity constrains loyalty 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. Note that the Oxford English Dictionary defines philanthropy as, “[t]he 
desire to promote the welfare of others, expressed especially by the generous donation 
of money to good causes.” Philanthropy, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), 
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/philanthropy [https://perma.cc/TB26-YVRY]. 
The origins are “[e]arly 17th century via late Latin from the Greek philanthrōpia, from 
philanthrōpos ‘man-loving.’” Id. 
 80. Some argue that corporate directors and managers have internalized the 
instrumentalist approach to social responsibility (including concerns about human 
rights), regardless of whether such an approach is legally required. In his analysis of 
Delaware’s seminal decision in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 
A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), and the uptake of the shareholder primacy norm in U.S. courts, 
Rhee suggests that the uncertainty around Revlon may have led to “overcompliance” 
with the norm: “When the boundaries of a rule are uncertain and the law is applied in an 
open-ended and potentially ex-ante indeterminate manner, law and economic literature 
has shown that the uncertainty can lead to over-compliance as parties may be 
incentivized to take additional precautions.” Rhee, supra note 69, at 2015. 
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reframes the problem by giving priority to the normative value of human 
rights over corporate law loyalty. 
B. THE INSTRUMENTALIST IMPERATIVE MEETS THE CATEGORICAL 
IMPERATIVE 
Chief Justice Leo Strine (as he then was) opines that “Dodge v. 
Ford and eBay are hornbook law because they make clear that if a 
fiduciary admits that he is treating an interest other than stockholder 
wealth as an end in itself, rather than an instrument to stockholder 
wealth, he is committing a breach of fiduciary duty.”81 He warns of the 
perils of confessing to treat people outside the corporation as ends in 
themselves: “When a fiduciary confesses that he in fact harbors the 
personal motive to put another interest, of whatever kind, ahead of the 
stockholders, the foundational premise of the business judgment rule is 
absent.”82 In other words, a manager who makes such a confession 
creates a litigation risk for herself and risks waiving the protection of the 
business judgment rule. On its face, this self-styled “clear-eyed” 
characterization of Delaware corporate law has troubling implications 
for decision makers who must weigh the distinct concerns of human 
rights risk to outsiders (risks to people) and corporate insiders (risks to 
business). But perhaps we should not overreact, as an ethically 
conflicted manager need only state for the record that her decision to 
respect human rights redounds to the benefit of the stockholders—she 
need only show that there is some plausible business case for her 
decision.83 
This technical fix via the business judgment rule may be 
pragmatically satisfying, but is it ethically tenable with regards to 
human rights concerns? Ethicists will recognize immediately the tension 
that lies between a strictly instrumentalist approach to the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights and the Kantian principle of 
humanity,84 which holds that we should never treat humanity as a means 
 
 81. Dangers of Denial, supra note 2, at 776–77. 
 82. Id. at 778–79. 
 83. See Padfield, supra note 72, at 9–10. 
 84. Kant’s principle of humanity is interpreted by ethicist Christine Korsgaard, 
such that, “[h]uman freedom is realized in the adoption of humanity as an end in 
itself . . . Kant first argues that there must be an unconditional end; second, that the end 
must be humanity.” Christine M. Korsgaard, Kant’s Formula of Humanity, 77 KANT-
STUDIEN 183, 186 (1986). 
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to an end, but always as an end in itself.85 The instrumentalist imperative 
articulated in the cases discussed above, and reaffirmed by Chief Justice 
Strine’s “clear-eyed” interpretation of corporate law sits uneasily with 
the values of “humanity, justice, generosity, and public spirit” that were 
so important in Adam Smith’s THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS.86 When 
concerns about human rights enter the picture, the categorical priority 
that Strine gives to stockholder wealth is no longer tenable. Paying 
regards to the potentially adverse impacts on human rights of business 
activity is not analogous to taking up a philanthropic cause. While 
philanthropy is praiseworthy, the idea of corporate respect for human 
rights is more closely tied to a sense of obligation than it is to 
voluntarism. With this sense of obligation in mind, the strictly 
instrumentalist treatment of non-shareholder interests is an inadequate 
framework for considering the interplay of a corporation’s economic 
interests (and by extension, the shareholder’s economic interests) and 
human rights concerns. 
The question that this article addresses is what space remains in 
corporate law to acknowledge the idea of human rights as parents of law 
rather than treating corporate respect for human rights as a shareholder 
value-enhancing, instrumental risk management tool.87 In its starkly 
realist formulation, mandatory instrumentalism takes us to an ethical 
impasse, as treating the corporate responsibility respect to human rights 
as a device to be employed for the ultimate benefit of stockholders 
constitutes the very negation of human rights as normative precepts.88 
 
 85. Sen critiques the engineering approach to economics in which human beings 
are treated as a means rather than ends in themselves. See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF 
JUSTICE 254 (2009). 
 86. See ADAM SMITH, THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 220–21 (Ryan P. Henley 
ed., Penguin Random House Co. 2010) (1759) [hereinafter THEORY OF MORAL 
SENTIMENTS]. 
 87. Florian Wettstein is highly critical of approaches to business and human rights 
that give priority to instrumental, risk-management uses of human rights in business 
decision-making. See generally Florian Wettstein, CSR and the Debate on Business and 
Human Rights: Bridging the Great Divide, 22 BUS. ETHICS Q. 739, 758 (2012). 
 88. Consider the instrumental imperative in light of Ronald Dworkin’s 
pronouncements on the non-morality of instrumental intent: 
For the moral value of beneficial activity, considered in itself, consists in the will 
or intentions of the actor. If he acts out of a desire to improve the welfare of 
others, his act has inherent moral value even if he does not benefit others. But of 
course, it has no inherent moral value if he acts with the intention of benefiting 
only himself. 
Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 211–12 (1980). 
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One unattractive practical implication of the instrumentalist imperative 
is that if a corporate fiduciary comes to believe that some human rights-
respecting action may lead to a reduction in the residual value of the 
enterprise over the long run (according to whatever valuation method 
employed), she might feel compelled not to take the rights-respecting 
approach. The decision maker may feel constrained by fiduciary law in 
her approach to human rights issues, rather than the other way around. 
Conversely, the more altruistically inclined fiduciary who uses corporate 
resources (or who foregoes a lucrative business opportunity) to respect 
human rights where it seems no plausible benefits accrue to the 
stockholders conceivably might be called out of bounds by those very 
stockholders.89 The burden of loyalty is a plastic though powerful yoke. 
Such glum results appear to follow analytically from the doctrinal 
parameters that Strine has laid out. And yet, an escape might be 
proposed: One could argue that for decision-making about human rights 
issues, the formalistic fiscal instrumentalism that applies with regards to 
corporate expenditures on philanthropy is not applicable.90 After all, the 
idea of respecting human rights derives from a sense of obligation, and 
not from mere kindness. Given the complexity of human rights issues, in 
most, if not all situations, it would be near impossible to quantify the 
long run return on investment (“ROI”) of any particular human rights-
respecting corporate action.91 In a hypothetical shareholder suit (here, 
we are in theoretical territory, as no such suit has ever been litigated), 
the human rights-respecting corporate decision makers would be 
required merely show that there was some rational basis for their 
decision, however slight.92 And yet, this still instrumental move takes us 
 
 89. See Padfield, supra note 72, at 5. 
 90. On the virtues of inconsistency, see Leszek Kolakowski, In Praise of 
Inconsistency, 11 DISSENT 201 (1964). 
 91. In arguing that shareholder primacy is law, Padfield asserts that corporate law’s 
fiduciary duty of loyalty entails a duty to calculate return on investment. See Padfield, 
supra note 72, at 5. 
 92. Allen et al. suggest a very permissive standard, i.e. that, “[s]ince the law cannot 
order directors to make correct decisions by fiat, it follows, in our view, that 
disinterested directors who act deliberately and in good faith should never be held liable 
for a resulting loss, no matter how stupid their decisions may seem ex post.” ALLEN, 
KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 12, at 231. Steinhardt proposes that the 
business judgment rule might permit or even require management to follow “best 
practices in the protection of human rights.” Ralph G. Steinhardt, Corporate 
Responsibility and the International Law of Human Rights: The New Lex Mercatoria, in 
NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 177, 214 (Phillip Alston ed., 2005). 
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even closer to the ethical void—by this minimalist account, a company’s 
human rights-respecting decisions are thought to be intra vires based on 
the mere plausibility that such moves will add to the residual value of 
the enterprise in some unspecified amount at some unspecified time. It 
should be apparent that the mere plausibility of increasing value for 
shareholders in the long run is not a strong normative basis on which to 
ground decision-making today where human rights are at stake. We 
want companies to respect human rights out of a sense of obligation, not 
because of what the directors’ reading of the tea leaves might reveal 
about long run residual outcomes for shareholders.93 
Nonetheless, for all practical purposes, social responsibility-minded 
managers might find adequate comfort in the plausible-sounding dictum 
that respecting human rights is good for business in the long run (one 
can take this further with the nostrum: What’s good for business is good 
for society). Whether an “intuitive formation of estimates”94 about the 
positive market-based synergies that may come with respecting human 
rights will motivate senior decision makers to implement an effective 
human rights policy for the global firm is decidedly unclear.95 This is a 
question ripe for empirical analysis that goes beyond the scope of this 
article. When it comes to corporate respect for human rights, one might 
well ask whether a collectively held hunch about the long run payoff for 
investors is really what matters. As I have argued here, long-run 
 
 93. It should also be noted that what is considered to be a long run horizon to 
investors is totally distinct from what a local community, individual or family considers 
as long term. This dissonance is of great relevance to company-community conflict 
since communities (rights-holders) and investment analysts, bankers, and business 
managers base their decision-making on very different time horizons. A one- or two-
year time horizon is simply untenable for a human rights impact or human rights risk 
assessment; five years will barely do. 
 94. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 314 (1921). 
 95. Some firms might see a “first mover” advantage in adopting human rights into 
their policy framework or some alternative. For example, Barrick Gold was the first 
major mining company to adopt a firm-wide human rights policy using the United 
Nations Guiding Principles as a starting point. See NIEN-HÊ HSIEH & REBECCA 
HENDERSON, HARV. BUS. SCH. CASE COLLECTION, PUTTING THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
INTO ACTION: HUMAN RIGHTS AT BARRICK GOLD (A) 1010 (2016). While the prospect of 
positive synergies might motivate a firm to implement a policy to respect human rights, 
Deniz Utlu and Jan-Christian Niebank consider the need for further research “to 
understand under what conditions a business risk calculation will result in the 
implementation of human rights due diligence.” DENIZ UTLU & JAN-CHRISTIAN 
NIEBANK, GERMAN INST. HUM. RTS., CALCULATED RISK: ECONOMIC VERSUS HUMAN 
RIGHTS REQUIREMENTS OF CORPORATE RISK ASSESSMENTS 19 (2017). 
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guesstimates about how respecting human rights today is good for 
shareholders in the long run are beside the point. Let us now return to 
consider the constraining effect of human rights as normative values on 
the range of corporate law’s loyalty mandate. 
C. HUMANITY CONSTRAINS LOYALTY (REFLECTIVE LOYALTY) 
In 1957, British jurist Lord Denning wrote that a corporation is led 
by a “brain and a nerve centre” which is comprised of directors and 
managers “who represent the directing mind and will of the company.”96 
Who is the “master” of this nerve center, if there is one at all?97 Are the 
shareholders its master? We have come full circle to the fine distinction 
that must be made between managerial fiduciary loyalty and employee 
obedience. As any firm is normally regarded as a hierarchical 
organization, each act taken by the individual working within it is 
expected to express allegiance to authority above.98 Indeed, the 
 
 96. HL Bolton (Engineering) Co. v. TJ Graham & Sons Ltd. [1957] 1 QB 159. 
 97. On the “organizing authority” and the control of servant by master as a 
constitutive feature of the firm, see R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 
386 (1937). Coase theorizes that economic activity will be brought inside and 
coordinated within a firm when it is more efficient than entering into transactions for 
that activity through the market mechanism: 
The question always is, will it pay to bring an extra exchange transaction under the 
organising authority? At the margin, the costs of organising within the firm will be 
equal either to the costs of organising in another firm or to the costs involved in 
leaving the transaction to be “organised” by the price mechanism. Business men 
will be constantly experimenting, controlling more or less, and in this way, 
equilibrium will be maintained. 
Id. at 404. 
 98. Ronald Coase articulated how the basic conditions of the master and servant 
relationship is an essential feature in the economic organization of the corporation. Id. 
at 403–04. In The Death of Liability, Lynn LoPucki describes Coase as “characterizing 
[the] bounds of [the] firm as that range of exchanges over which [the] market system 
was suppressed and resource allocation was accomplished instead by authority and 
direction.” Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 Yale L.J. 1, 65 n.272 (1996) 
(emphasis added). Karl Marx writes of the power of command in a capitalist enterprise 
as not unlike the power of command in a military hierarchy: “That a capitalist should 
command on the field of production is now as indispensable as that a general should 
command on the field of battle . . . . An industrial army of workmen, under the 
command of a capitalist, requires, like a real army, officers (managers), and sergeants 
(foremen, overlookers), who, while the work is being done, command in the name of 
the capitalist.” Karl Marx, Capital, in THE ECONOMIC NATURE OF THE FIRM: A 
READER 50–51 (Louis Putterman & Randall S. Kroszner eds., 1996). He speaks of 
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subordination of servant-employee to master-employer is a 
straightforward matter in any business organization—the master orders 
while the servant complies. Yet, the matter of to whom the company 
directors owe this style of allegiance, if at all, is not so clear-cut. As 
Clark writes, the shareholders “never delegated any authority to the 
directors.”99 In a business corporation, he explains, the directors acquire 
their authority to manage the business by the operation of corporate law 
statutes, not by shareholder fiat!100 
The master-servant relationship that is so critical to the 
coordination of production within a firm for satisfying the material 
objectives of the business does not apply to the office of the corporate 
director, whose “special role,” as Eugene Fama observed, is “decision 
making.”101 Corporate law has come to formalize the most basic 
expectations of decision-making directors and officers by imposing on 
them the very malleable fiduciary duty of loyalty to the corporation and 
its shareholders. The varying operative requirements of this duty from 
one jurisdiction to another are politically and juridically contested in 
diverse forums—in evolving legal doctrine, in corporate law theory, and 
in public debates over the social roles and responsibilities of business. 
By some accounts, as in Strine’s interpretation of Delaware corporate 
law, the fiduciary’s pledge of loyalty implies a style of obligation to 
focus solely on maximizing stockholder welfare (though not necessarily 
over the short term), to the exclusion of all other interests save for those 
which fall within the confines of her rather limited directorial 
discretion.102 By other accounts, a broader notion of the social purpose 
 
“barrack discipline” that is needed to keep the factory running: “All combined labour 
on a large scale requires, more or less, a directing authority . . . . The place of the slave 
driver’s lash is taken by the overlooker’s book of penalties.” Id. at 50, 59. 
 99. Agency Costs, supra note 14, at 57. 
 100. Id. at 56–59 (“By statute in every state, the board of directors of a corporation 
has the power and duty to manage or supervise its business. The stockholders do 
not . . . . As a matter of statutory law, stockholders’ powers in a public corporation are 
extremely limited . . . . To influence corporate managers, then, stockholders can vote 
for directors and approve or veto director-initiated organic changes, but cannot do much 
else.” Id. at 58–59. 
 101. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. 
ECON. 288, 290 (1980). 
 102. See Dangers of Denial, supra note 2, at 783. In 1996, Frank Easterbrook and 
Daniel Fischel argued that one “operational assumption of successful firms” is that “the 
residual risk bearers [shareholders] have contracted for a promise to maximize long-run 
profits of the firm, which in turn maximizes the value of their stock.” FRANK H. 
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of business in society plays a vital role in corporate value seeking103 and 
in responsible investment.104 Either way, the fiduciary’s pledge of 
loyalty to the corporation is a free one—loyalty is gained by 
appointment, not by coercion or out of necessity. This “free” pledge of 
loyalty is constrained by an ecosystem of normative values that 
corporate decision makers inhabit. 
We now return to the question with which we began: What is a 
loyal corporate fiduciary to do when concerns about human rights enter 
the picture? Four hundred years ago, in the venerated case of Sutton’s 
Hospital, Lord Coke averred that corporations “have no souls” and so 
“cannot do fealty.”105 In other words, a soulless legal entity has no 
capacity for loyalty; only its flesh-and-blood decision makers have this 
ability. Being human, a corporate decision maker’s loyalty is expressed 
in judgment and action that is conscious and reflective, not mechanical 
 
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE oF CORPORATE LAW 
36 (1996) (emphasis added); see also Padfield, supra note 72, at 5. 
 103. Elhauge argues that “shareholder insulation and collective-action problems will 
make shareholders underresponsive to social and moral sanctions,” and so, it is efficient 
for the board of directors to be responsive to such sanctions, and it is within their 
managerial discretion to do so. Einer R. Elhauge, Corporate Managers’ Operational 
Discretion to Sacrifice Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND BUSINESS 48 (Bruce L. Hay et al. eds., 2005); see also The New 
Paradigm Roadmap, supra note 72. 
 104. New terrain in the debate over fiduciary duties has opened very recently in 
Canada with respect to indigenous people and responsible investment. See JOHN 
BORROWS & SHAYLA PRAUD, RECONCILIATION AND RESPONSIBLE INV. INITIATIVE, 
TEACHINGS OF SUSTAINABILITY, STEWARDSHIP, & RESPONSIBILITY: INDIGENOUS 
PERSPECTIVES ON OBLIGATION, WEALTH, TRUSTS, & FIDUCIARY DUTY 3 (Sep. 25, 
2020), https://reconciliationandinvestment.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Sustain-
Stewardship-Responsiblity-v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9XV-EGGN]. While their 
discussion pertains directly to the fiduciary duty in trusts, the authors describe how 
indigenous legal orders comprise part of the wider ecosystem of norms for fiduciary 
decision makers: “[W]e explore the legal orders of a small sampling of indigenous 
nations and peoples to identify related notions of stewardship, loyalty, responsibility, 
good faith, obligation, and wealth within their traditional laws. We then explore how 
Canadian law might recognize these sources of law through sui generis formulations.” 
Id. 
 105. SIR EDWARD COKE, The Case of Sutton’s Hospital, in THE SELECTED WRITINGS 
AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 347, 371–72 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003), 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/911#Coke_0462-01_622 [https://perma.cc/33N2-
X6AN]. 
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or algorithmic.106 Facing a tragic decision dilemma that involves adverse 
impacts on the human rights of people outside the corporation, a 
manager’s conscience may weigh heavily.107 The morally conflicted 
fiduciary duty-bearer is free to resign her office rather than cross a line 
in the sand. After all, the individual fiduciary decision maker’s loyalty, 
whether to country, friend, or company, has its own range. 
And yet, the fate of others inside or outside the firm may grow 
worse when the reflective fiduciary gives up her place, as her successor 
might not be so wise, altruistic, or prudent. Seeing this hazard, the 
fiduciary might choose instead to keep her role, to use her power 
perspicaciously, to do what she regards as the right thing as best as she 
can. And by making this choice, the normative value of humanity and of 
human rights constrain loyalty to all but her very own conscience. 
So, who is the master of the corporate nerve center? It can only be 
the decision maker’s own conscience. The values of humanity and 
human rights constrain the reach of any free being’s pledge of loyalty to 
the corporation and its shareholders—to recognize this is to practice for 
oneself and expect from others only reflective loyalty. And thus, 
corporate law’s duty of loyalty must be regarded only as reflective 
loyalty that is bound by the constraints of ethics. The reverse 
approach—that the corporate duty of loyalty rises above all other 
normative values as a kind of apex duty–is simply untenable. 
III. REFLECTIVE LOYALTY, HUMANITY, AND THE CORPORATE 
DECISION MAKER 
In standard textbooks of microeconomics, the firm is conceived as 
a unique actor that, if functioning properly, seeks to maximize profit to 
the exclusion of all others’ interests, save for those that have 
instrumental value to the firm’s profit-seeking goals.108 By this 
 
 106. Frank Knight observes that: “The decisive factors in the case [of exercising 
judgment] are so largely on the inside of the person making the decisions that the 
‘instances’ are not amenable to objective description and external control.” FRANK H. 
KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 104 (1921) (emphasis added). 
 107. See generally Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits 
of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1005, 1014–17 (2000) (discussing 
Nussbaum’s “tragic dilemmas”). 
 108. Christian List and Kai Spiekermann describe the growing interest in the thesis 
that: 
[T]he most parsimonious explanations of the behavior of such collectivities 
[including corporations] often involve modeling them as purposive, rational agents 
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abstraction, the firm’s flesh-and-blood reflective corporate decision 
makers are transmogrified into anonymous “agents” of the shareholders 
whose imperfections as decision-makers (and the costs the shareholders 
must bear to mitigate such imperfections), may be aggregated into sum 
“agency costs.”109 By this view, human imperfection, and thereby, 
human introspection, is regarded as a source of inefficiency. In a 
theoretical world without such imperfections, the agents’ roles as loyal 
fiduciaries might be programmed and exercised in a mechanical and 
deductively predictable style; in the real world, theorists propose instead 
to find ways “to get the incentives right” and ways to eliminate the 
underlying systemic sources of agency costs where they can.110 
By this aggregative approach, the flesh-and-blood corporate 
decision makers are treated as means to an end—they are counted as 
another factor of production, as are employees, whose residual-reducing 
costs to shareholders ought to be cut back. The most efficient way to 
reduce agency costs, by this approach, is to implement system-wide 
technical fixes using incentives and mixed modes of deterrence, 
employing the “carrot and stick” devices that are central to the analysis 
and methods of law and economics. In treating decision makers in this 
way, the conscious and reflective aspect of individual fiduciary loyalty 
mostly disappears. The maxim that humanity constrains loyalty serves 
as a normative antidote to instrumentalist thinking of this kind. 
I have argued that the force of fiduciary loyalty is tantamount to the 
gravity that holds the corporate edifice together. And yet, as Clark 
explained long ago, fiduciary loyalty is a malleable “residual 
concept.”111 Its demands are precise and nebulous at the same time. 
Katsuhito Iwai observes that “[t]he most conspicuous feature of 
fiduciary law is its highly moralistic tone.”112 The word-senses of the 
 
in their own right, with preferences and judgments that need not be a simple 
function of the underlying individual preferences and judgments, although they 
supervene on them . . . . Even microeconomists take this stance towards some 
collectives, for example when they model firms as unified rational actors in the 
theory of the firm. 
Christian List & Kai Spiekermann, Methodological Individualism and Holism in 
Political Science: A Reconciliation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 629, 639 (2013). 
 109. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 19. 
 110. See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 16, at 29, 30–40. 
 111. CORPORATE LAW, supra note 6, at 141. 
 112. Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality 
Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 622 
(1999). 
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fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and good faith are more closely related 
to concepts in ethics than to positive law regulatory rules; they exude the 
moralistic flavor that permeates Adam Smith’s treatise on THE THEORY 
OF MORAL SENTIMENTS113 more so than the very technical and 
computational dimensions of THE WEALTH OF NATIONS,114 though they 
have great relevance to both. We might think of the fiduciary duty 
concept as an aspect of corporate morality as much as it is a feature of 
corporate law. However we define those duties, it should be clear that 
the contested legal doctrinal demands of the corporate duties of good 
faith, loyalty, and care are distinct from the moral requirements that 
similarly titled virtues may entail.115 
While positive law attempts to circumscribe the substance of 
corporate fiduciary duties through legal contests in doctrine and 
scholarship, the fiduciary’s choice to exercise reflective judgment with 
regards to such duties (qua virtue and law) is primordially human. And 
so, I proposed that we strive for and expect of others only reflective 
loyalty. Reflective loyalty recognizes the constraining effect that the 
values of humanity and human rights have on the reach of loyalty to the 
corporation and its shareholders. 
 
 113. See generally THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 86. 
 114. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS (1776). 
 115. In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, John Kleinig characterizes loyalty 
as a virtue: 
Loyalty is usually seen as a virtue, albeit a problematic one. It is constituted 
centrally by perseverance in an association to which a person has become 
intrinsically committed as a matter of his or her identity. Its paradigmatic 
expression is found in close friendship, to which loyalty is integral, but many other 
relationships and associations seek to encourage it as an aspect of affiliation or 
membership: families expect it, organizations often demand it, and countries do 
what they can to foster it. 
JOHN KLEINIG, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. Loyalty (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2017). 
On the distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding virtues, see Gabriele 
Taylor & Sybil Wolfram, The Self-Regarding and Other-Regarding Virtues, 18 PHIL. Q. 
238 (1968). 
 
